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I appreciate Kyrill Potapov’s recent response “Objectification and the Labour of the 
Negative in the Origin of Human Thinking.” There, Potapov defends Vygotsky against my 
view that Tomasello’s account of the role of joint intentionality in the phylogenesis of 
human cognition can help avoid the problems of Vygotsky’s “directive-centric” account of 
the origin of human thought. Potapov presents a strong challenge to anyone thinking of 
applying Tomasello’s account of phylogenesis to Vygotsky’s theory of ontogenesis. However, I’m 
skeptical that this applies to my critique of phylogenesis in Vygotsky.  
 
Potapov perhaps rightly took issue with my formulation of Vygotsky’s account as 
“Machiavellian.” I’ll admit that this phrasing was somewhat tongue-in-cheek. It was meant to 
point out that Vygotsky, in centralizing directive speech acts in phylogenesis, seems to run 
the risk of endorsing Humphrey’s “Machiavellian Intelligence” hypothesis—of which surely 
no Vygotskian, or Marxist for that matter, would likely approve. Humphrey (1976) posits 
competition and social subterfuge as the main drivers of human cognitive phylogenesis. Moll 
and Tomasello call their account of cognitive origins the “Vygotsky Intelligence Hypothesis” 
to stress that “the unique aspects of human cognition … were driven by, or even constituted 
by, social cooperation” (2007, 639). However, my point was that even Vygotsky might not 
be so “Vygotskian” when it comes to phylogenesis.  
 
Tomasello claims that competition and subordination drive non-human cognition. The 
representational states available to such individually intentional agents remain situation-
bound, reflecting ego-centric, and never joint or collective, goals. Joint intentionality, 
however, provides the missing phylogenetic link between more primitive individually 
intentional hominids and the fully collective intentionality of behaviorally modern Homo 
sapiens, replete with propositional representations, reflective inferences, and importantly for 
Potapov, normative forms of self-governance. I claimed that insofar as Vygotsky lacks a 
notion of joint intentionality, his account of the phylogenetic development of cognition risks 
explaining not human but rather non-human hominids (i.e., Tomasello’s “individually 
intentional” agents).  
 
Potapov doubts that Vygotsky needs a theory of intentionality, joint or otherwise, to explain 
the emergence of higher mental functions. But his alternative doesn’t address the fact that 
Vygotsky sure seems to be talking about individually intentional agents when he should be 
talking about joint and collective agents. Instead, Potapov takes issue with my positioning of 
Vygotsky among “Liberal” theories of consciousness. This includes labeling Vygotsky as 
“Machiavellian,” applying Hegel’s master/slave dialectic to Vygotsky’s theory of the origin of 
language and higher mental functions, and relying on Tomasello insofar as he draws from 
analytic social ontology. This response will attempt to redress these criticisms while also 
expanding on some other aspects of Tomasello that are relevant to the Vygotskian project.     
 
Vygotsky: Dialectics in Mind  
 
Vygotsky does seem to adhere to the general Marxian critique of classical liberalism and its 
correlating philosophies of mind as exemplified in Hobbes, Locke, and especially Berkeley 






“liberal” analyses bore out in a mechanistic and individualistic internalism, where 
consciousness “was measured uniquely by perception and representation as actualized in the 
reflexive knowledge of the individual” (Mamardašvili 1986, 104). Transposed into the arena 
of early 20th century psychology, for Vygotsky this meant overcoming the eliminative 
materialism and psycho-physical parallelism of the reflexologists and introspectionists, who 
either apportioned mental phenomena no “objective existence whatsoever” or resorted to 
mind-brain dualism to effectively explain away the problem of the origin of consciousness 
(Vygotsky 1997a, 46).  
 
For these early psychological schools, the problem of causal interaction between the 
subjective and objective so familiar to the early moderns is recapitulated, along with the 
related and seemingly insurmountable problem of the epiphenomenalism of the subjective. 
Vygotsky took it as his task to surmount such a divide by recontextualizing consciousness as 
an object of study. As a materialist, he saw the subjective as simply another aspect of the 
objective “Mind without behavior is as impossible as behavior without mind, if only because they are 
one and the same” (1997a, 46). Thus, in concert with Marx, human relations and their 
greater historical and social structure must be taken as the site from which the individual’s 
consciousness develops.1  
 
Potopov does well to remind us of some this in pointing out Vygotsky’s rejection of the 
dualism that haunted early 20th century psychology (Potapov 2021, 25). But then why does 
Vygotsky run the risk of being associated with such “cognitive liberalism” when he clearly 
seems to prefer a critical, dialectical account? My answer was, and still is, that Vygotsky’s 
affinity for Pierre Janet’s “command-origin” theory of language poses a problem, specifically 
with its idea that social subordination is the primary function of speech in a phylogenetic 
context. In Vygotsky’s picture of the (pre)historical origin of language and mind, 
subordination in the social world is mirrored internally as the subordination and regulation 
of affectual drives. Homo sapiens achieve behavioral modernity insofar as they control their 
impulses and focus their attention willfully. The higher mental functions are achieved by a 
means of self-mastery, which mirrors some primordial social scene that appears to be a 
“Machiavellian” one—or at least one that takes domination and social antagonism as coeval 
with the origin of human-specific cognition. 
 
The Antagonism of Naming 
 
In my earlier piece, I followed Jones (2009, 2019, 2020) in characterizing this aspect of 
Vygotsky’s account as “antagonistic,” in the sense that for Vygotsky, primitive mental 
development seems to be marked by a dialectic of dominance and subservience. I likened 
this to something akin to Hegel’s master/slave dialectic. Potapov takes issue with 
characterizing Vygotsky’s account of internalization in this manner, and points to the 
Pittsburgh Hegelians as a way of viewing the master/slave dialectic not as a power struggle 
but a process of recognitive affirmation. Potapov is probably right that my interpretation of 
Hegel here is colored and Kojève. But I’m not committed to such a reading. Maybe the 
 
1 This still does not dispense with the problem of the causal interaction between the subjective and objective 
aspects of reality, as the problem of downward causation is still very much an issue for non-reductive 
materialists (Kim 2003). But for Vygotsky, such issues can only be resolved once a materialist and empirical 
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pragmatists are right. I’m not in a position to say.2 What I do stand by, however, is my claim 
that Vygotsky’s account of primordial speech and mental development centralizes a 
dominant/subordinative dialectic. If this is bad Hegel, so be it. But Vygotsky invites the 
Kojèvian comparison with claims such as the following: 
 
The relation of psychological functions is genetically linked to real relations 
between people: regulation of the word, verbalized behavior = power-
submission …  Hence Leont’ev’s example of labor: both what the overseer 
does and what the slave does are combined in one person: this is a 
mechanism of voluntary attention and labor … (Vygotsky 1989, 57). 
 
According to Janet, the word is always a command because it is a basic means of controlling 
behavior. For this reason, if we want to explain genetically from what the volitional function 
of the word is derived, why the word subordinates motor reaction, what the origin of the 
power of the word over behavior is in both ontogenesis and phylogenesis, we unavoidably 
arrive at the real function of the command. Janet says that the power of the word over 
mental functions is based on the real power of the superior over the subordinate; the relation 
of mental functions must be genetically attributed to real relations between people. 
Regulating another’s behavior by means of the word leads gradually to the development of 
verbalized behavior of the individual himself. (Vygotsky 1997b, 103-104) 
 
To be clear, if the issue one of labels, then I’ll substitute “Janetian” for both “Machiavellian” 
and “Hegelian.” The point is, Vygotsky still uses language of subordination and domination 
in his account of the phylogenetic origin of higher mental functions. I need more from 
Potapov to dissuade me of this. Even Vygotsky and Luria’s account of primitive 
“mnemotechnical” devices points to an antagonistic labor scene. Invoking Karl Bücher’s 
Rhythmus und Arbeit (1899), Vygotsky and Luria describe primitive, percussive, “digging 
sticks” that function to replicate the sound of a “work cry or command” with the “purpose 
of rhythmically organizing work” (Vygotsky and Luria 2016, 138). This adds another 
dimension of materiality to Vygotsky’s idea that “regulation of the word, verbalized behavior 
= power-submission” (Vygotsky 1989, 57). But it doesn’t point to a story of recognition.  
 
It’s possible that there has been a misunderstanding here, since the examples Potapov uses 
to defend a nonsubordinative account of internalization all deal with childhood 
development. In particular, Potapov cites instructive passages from Vygotsky which explain 
childhood ego development in pretense play. These are interesting, but don’t fairly address 
the problem that I’m working on, which is Vygotsky’s account of the phylogenesis of higher 





2 A full treatment of Hegel on recognition not possible here. But it would presumably include a discussion of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and the grounding of institutional reality. My point in referring to the master/slave 
dialectic was generally to point to the idea that Vygotsky’s “command” or “directive” account seems stuck in 






Vygotsky and Tomasello: Pretense Play  
 
There is a way in which Vygotsky’s account of childhood play does cohere with Tomasello’s 
intentionalistic account. I didn’t go into this in replying to Azeri (2020), but since it’s on the 
table, I’ll mention a few things.  
 
For Vygotsky—and Potapov relays this much to us—play serves as a transitional stage in 
ontogenesis wherein the child learns to perceive the world not merely with respect to 
environmental affordances (i.e., as object-bound) but rather in terms of its varied levels of 
meaningfulness (i.e., as subject-bound). As Vygotsky (2016) states:  
 
Action according to rules begins to be determined by thought, not by objects 
themselves. This is such a reversal of the child’s relationship to the real, 
immediate, concrete situation that it is hard to evaluate its full significance. 
The child does not do this all at once. It is terribly difficult for a child to split 
off thought (the meaning of a word) from its object. Play is a transitional 
stage in this direction. At that critical moment when a stick—i.e., an object—
becomes a pivot for severing the meaning of horse from a real horse, one of 
the basic psychological structures determining the child’s relationship to 
reality is radically altered (13).  
 
In a sense, Vygotsky is describing the transition in perception that occurs when the child can 
see—to use a favorite example of Searle’s (2005)—not merely a man running across a line on 
a green field, but the scoring of a touchdown. According to Vygotsky, “This is something 
for which there is no analogy in animal perception. Essentially it lies in the fact that I do not 
see the world simply in colour and shape, but also as a world with sense and meaning” 
(2016, 9). Verbal imaginative play, therefore, serves to aid the child in her future task of 
conceptual thinking:  
 
To separate the meaning of ‘horse’ from a real horse, and to transfer it to a 
stick (which is the necessary material pivot to keep the meaning from 
evaporating), and then to act with the stick as if it really were a horse, is a 
vital transitional stage to operating with meanings alone (15). 
 
In the course of development, such play comes to introduce rule-based behavior, which 
further drives the self-regulation of affective drives: “by subordinating themselves to rules 
children renounce what they want—since subjection to rule and renunciation of 
spontaneous impulsive action constitute the path to maximum pleasure in play” (loc. cit.). In 
effect, Vygotsky is describing the role that play has in the creation of deontic sources of 
action, where a more immediate physical desire is supplanted with one imposed “from 
without,” based on the regulative normative nature of a social activity:  
 
In short, play gives the child a new form of desires, i.e., teaches him to desire 
by relating his desires to a fictitious “I”—to his role in the game and its rules. 
Therefore, a child’s greatest achievements are possible in play—achievements 
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This is remarkably close to what Searle calls the creation of deontic power though the 
imposition of status functions, i.e., the “matters of rights, duties, obligations, etc.” that come 
to define the specifically human forms of social life (2005, 11-12). For Vygotsky, the genesis 
of institutional reality and the deontic powers residing therein is explained by the gradual 
internalization of meaningful determinants of action, whereby the “leading aspect” of such 
internalization is childhood pretense play (Vygotsky 2016, 17).3  
 
Tomasello most directly discusses play and its role in ontogenesis in his paper with Rakoczy 
(2007). There they argue that joint-attentive pretense activity makes way for developmentally 
later arbitrarily symbolic social-ontological procedures and practices. They suggest that in 
spontaneous joint-pretense play, one sees an X term being used to denote some Y 
phenomenon by virtue of a proto-performative declaration. In such cases, the context 
conditions that govern the performative’s intelligibility and felicitous execution are also 
spontaneously generated by virtue of some of joint intentional convention. And though they 
lack the stability of a proper social institution (Sawyer 2005), they do have a normative and 
deontic dimension (however temporally contingent that may be) which can authorize further 
signifying acts. 
 
However, as concerns play and phylogenesis, Tomasello (2014) suggests that the advent of 
iconic gestural communication has the effect of developmentally grounding joint pretense 
activity. Through its combinatorial potential to represent nearly anything removed from the 
immediately perceived situation, such gestural communication serves as the basis for the 
imaginative joint intentional pretense activity that comes to underwrite the imposition and 
recognition of status functions. In other words, this type of communicative activity marks a 
transitional stage of proto-institutional recognition, which can come to modify behavior 
either negatively in prohibiting certain actions or positively in creating the conditions that 
call forth and legitimize further activity. Joint intentional pretense play for Tomasello thus 
serves to circumscribe the conditions upon which Searle’s “status functions” may be said to 
“function.”  
 
Vygotsky can flesh out some of the details here insofar as he shows that in childhood play 
socially meaningful potentials of activity are gradually separated from environmentally 
determined courses of action. In the transition to rule-based imaginative play, social 
meanings become internalized and the child learns to act not according to her immediate 
impulse but rather in the service of fulfilling a cultural norm. The child, that is, acts 
according to spontaneously and imaginatively generated rules of the play activity. The 
coordination between external (social) and internal (personal) intentional states comes to 
further the development of abstract thought and the realization and acceptance of cultural 
norms. To apply this back to Tomasello, the implicit speculation is that in phylogenesis 
progressively more stable pretense frames emerge as such joint intentional interactions 
 
3 Veresov and Barrs (2016) contend that although the concept of a “leading activity” itself remains 
underdeveloped in Vygotsky’s work, it serves as a general concept of development for Leontiev, who utilizes it 
to describe the “activity the development of which brings about major changes in the child’s mind and within 
which mental processes occur that prepare the child’s transition to a new and higher stage of development” 






transition to full-fledged collectively intentional interactions. These then go on to 
simultaneously constrain and enable certain courses of socially legitimate activity on the part 
of the participants insofar as such fall under some normative description. 
 
Tying Up Loose Ends  
 
This mention of Searle brings me to another issue with Potapov’s reading. Potapov claims 
that Tomasello’s centralization of intentionality—a concept about which Searle also writes—
makes it so that Tomasello somehow inherits Searle’s metaphysics of mind and perception 
(which seems to include a commitment to naïve realism and some kind of dualism).4 I’m 
afraid I don’t follow Potapov here, both with respect to his reading of Searle and how it 
applies to Vygotsky and Tomasello. But I won’t get into parsing what I think Potapov means 
because Searle’s metaphysical baggage (whatever that may be) is not relevant one way or 
another for Tomasello’s account.5 Tomasello also uses the language of “propositional 
attitudes,” a favorite of Davidson, yet this hardly commits Tomasello to Davidson’s 
“anomalous monism.” Whether Searle is a dualist or naïve realist—it doesn’t matter for 
Tomasello. For all it’s worth, Searle could be an eliminative materialist who has concocted a 
useful vocabulary of folk psychological states just for fun. That wouldn’t make Tomasello an 
eliminative materialist just because he uses those intentionalistic terms.  
 
However, I will concede to Potapov that Searle’s notion of collective intentionality is indeed 
“frictionless.” (Potapov 2021, 24). Potapov is not the first to point out that Searle’s account 
of collective intentionality is somewhat lacking (see e.g., Wilson 2007). I won’t defend Searle 
here but I will point out that Tomasello likely agrees. His entire project in A Natural History of 
Thinking is to show the phylogenesis of collective intentionality and norm-governed 
behavior. Joint intentionality in this account is taken as a transitional, prehistorical, cognitive 
phenomenon that seeks to explain just how it is that humans can be born into a world of 
rules, norms, and obligations. Potapov (2021) misses this aspect of Tomasello when he 
claims that:   
 
Tomasello takes from Searle the assumption of a ready and stable subject 
who can recognize “common goals” in engaging in an activity. Common 
goals are at the heart of the theory of joint intentionality. But positing such 
goals is neither justified nor necessary, as Brandom’s Hegelian account of 
deontic scorekeeping demonstrates (25). 
 
 
4 It would be nice to know what kind of dualist (substance? property? epistemological?), but Potapov doesn’t 
say.  
5 While it would be rich if Searle spent his career combating substance dualism only to end up a substance 
dualist, I doubt this is the case. To the question of whether Searle is a property dualist—maybe (though see 
Searle 2002), but this still doesn’t matter for Tomasello. Moreover, Vygotsky’s early polemics against 
psychophysical parallelism and (what we now call) eliminative materialism aren’t fine grained enough to really 
apply to contemporary discussions of perception (e.g., Genone 2016). Was Vygotsky a direct realist? A 
representationalist? A disjunctivist? I don’t think there’s a clear answer, though perhaps Potapov could try to 
work one out. Moreover, Vygotsky’s comments here are directed to the problem of mental causation, not 
perception per se. Regarding this (separate) issue, Vygotsky had no positive account, though he did claim that 
we should strive “to state the problem correctly and in a timely manner, and then the solution will sooner or 
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Tomasello does not inherit a “precritical rationalism” from Searle (loc. cit.). His object is to 
explain the phylogenetic transition from apes, who have neither deontic commitments nor 
collective goals, to humans who do. His account of joint intentionality is hardly cribbed from 
Searle (or the many other authors who work on the notion) but is an original contribution to 
explaining the prehistorical development of uniquely-human consciousness.  
 
I don’t have the space to give full justice to Tomasello here, but to put it briefly, Tomasello 
explains that in addition to socially recursive inferences and primitive self-reflection, joint 
intentional collaboration and communication allows for two important advancements in the 
self-monitoring available to early (proto) humans. Whereas the individually intentional 
creature may monitor her own behavior “including its psychological underpinnings with 
respect to such things as memory and decision making,” joint intentional humans begin to 
engage in both cooperative and communicative self-monitoring (Tomasello 2014, 74.). As 
Tomasello claims:  
 
Early humans’ concerns for how their collaborative partners viewed them—
and their active attempts to manage this impression—provided a new motive 
for actions, namely, to coordinate with the evaluative expectations of 
potential partners. Individuals thus began to cede power over themselves to 
the second personal evaluations of others because these evaluations 
determined their future collaborative opportunities (75). 
 
Communicative self-monitoring concerns the active monitoring of an agent’s own 
communicative acts “in anticipation of how they might be comprehended and/or 
interpreted by the recipient” (75). Maximizing the intelligibility of the communicative act was 
the goal of early human communicators, and such could be accomplished insofar as deictic 
(ostensive pointing) and symbolic (pantomime) communicative acts were overt and thus able 
to be perceived and altered by the communicator as she saw fit. The acts themselves were 
comprehended perspectivally, from the point of view of the recipient. For Tomasello, this 
motive for communicative intelligibility comes to constitute what will later develop as the 
“social norms of rationality” (76).  
 
In effect, the collaborative social arrangement moved the individually intentional agent 
beyond the egocentric self-monitoring of the previously competitive social model, and the 
“I” for the first time considered itself from the point of view of the second-personal social 
other. While this is still far from the abstract third-person normativity of fully human, 
collectively intentional, agents, it does represent for Tomasello the first step in the origin of 
the social norms of morality.  
 
This doesn’t seem to be an instance of “assuming a ready and stable subject” (Potapov 2021, 
25). But it does exemplify Tomasello taking pains to show how such a stable subject 
phylogenetically emerges. I’ll admit that this idea of perspectival cognition, or “second personal 
self-monitoring,” does address the origin of the higher mental functions in a way that 
Potapov might be more comfortable with—in Potatpov’s words, “it is not... a 
‘dominant/subordinative dialectic’ as it does not say anything about the use of misuse of 






By Way of Conclusion ... 
 
A final remark—Potapov claims that I along with Tomasello engage in “flattening of higher 
and lower psychological functions to one plane” (2021, 28). Maybe I wasn’t clear when 
explaining that:  
 
The apprehension and utilization of the sign marks a transformational leap 
between unmediated affective communication as exhibited in apes and the 
mediated linguistic communication of early humans. Such a phylogenetic 
transition is illustrated in the movement from a stage of (a) “receptive” self-
monitoring (affectively based on situationally bound stimuli) to a stage of (b) 
cognitive, conceptual, self-monitoring (where the individual can take on the 
perspective of another in relation to her own cognitive states) (Drain 2021, 9). 
 
It’s true that I introduced this transition from lower to higher mental functions as 
“Vygotsky’s,” and perhaps that’s where the confusion lies. But Tomasello’s language is 
present throughout this formulation, especially with respect to “self-monitoring.” Just to 
drive the point home, Tomasello does clearly recapitulate Vygotsky’s distinction between 
higher and lower mental functions, and in a way totally amenable to Potapov’s emphasis on 
how social activity can free the human from affordance-based “stimulus-response relations” 
(2021, 26). However, considering that my discussion concerns the phylogenesis of human 
cognition, the lower/higher binary can double as the distinction between non-
human/human intelligence.   
 
I noted Tomasello’s account of “lower” (non-human) mental functions mostly in my earlier 
response to Azeri (Drain 2020, 22), but it suffices to say here that for Tomasello, lower 
mental functions are characterized as those mental states of the individually intentional 
agent. This includes imagistic representations that are situationally bound, causal and 
intentional inferences, and primitive self-monitoring. Higher mental functions (those bound 
by normative self-governance, reflective inferences, and objective/conventional 
representations with propositional content) are only available to those hominids who have 
passed through an intermediary stage of joint intentionality.  
 
It is this phylogenetic middle ground of joint intentionality where evolutionarily urgent 
collaborative practices (in response, Tomasello notes, to new foraging ecologies in the late 
Pliocene) began the transition from lower to higher mental functions (Tomasello 2014, 78). 
This notion of transition is pivotal for Tomasello’s “Vygotskian” project, and it fills out the 
void in the phylogenetic application of Vygotsky’s more rudimentary higher/lower 
distinction. Appealing to norms and deontic scorekeeping, as Potapov suggests, isn’t much 
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